Designing Economic Instruments and Participatory Institutions for Environmental Management in India by Murty, M.N.
	

	
	


 

	
			
	 
! "	##$%%%
&"##$%
#' "	'()* '+,-
./*'"	000+* '+,-
SANDEE Working Paper No. 48-10
April 2010
South Asian Network for Development and Environmental Economics (SANDEE)
PO Box 8975, EPC 1056
Kathmandu, Nepal
Designing Economic Instruments and Participatory
Institutions for Environmental Management in India
M.N. Murty
Institute of Economic Growth
University Enclave, Delhi-110007, India
2 SANDEE Working Paper No. 48-10
Published by the South Asian Network for Development and Environmental Economics
(SANDEE)
PO Box 8975, EPC 1056 Kathmandu, Nepal.
Telephone: 977-1-5003222, 552 6391 Fax: 977-1-5003299
SANDEE research reports are the output of research projects supported by the South
Asian Network for Development and Environmental Economics. The reports have been
peer reviewed and edited. A summary of the findings of SANDEE reports are also
available as SANDEE Policy Briefs.
National Library of Nepal Catalogue Service:
M.N. Murty
Designing Economic Instruments and Participatory Institutions for Environmental Management
in India
(SANDEE Working Papers, ISSN 1893-1891; 2010- WP 48)
ISBN: 978 - 9937 -8218 - 6 - 5
Key words:
1. Pollution Tax
2. Bargaining
3. Collective Action
4. Transaction Costs
5. Decentralized Solutions
6. India
II
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily
represent those of the South Asian Network for Development and Environmental
Economics or its sponsors unless otherwise stated.
SANDEE Working Paper No. 48-10 3III
Comments should be sent to M.N. Murty, Institute of Economic Growth, University Enclave
Delhi-110007, India, mn_murty@hotmail.com
The South Asian Network for Development and
Environmental Economics
The South Asian Network for Development and Environmental Economics (SANDEE) is a
regional network that brings together analysts from different countries in South Asia to address
environment-development problems. SANDEE’s activities include research support, training,
and information dissemination. Please see www.sandeeonline.org for further information about
SANDEE.
SANDEE is financially supported by International Development Research Center (IDRC),
The Ford Foundation, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA),
the World Bank and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD). The
opinions expressed in this paper are the author’s and do not necessarily represent those of
SANDEE’s donors.
The Working Paper series is based on research funded by SANDEE and supported with
technical assistance from network members, SANDEE staff and advisors.
4 SANDEE Working Paper No. 48-10IV
SANDEE Working Paper No. 48-10 5
TABLE OF CONTENTS
V
1. INTRODUCTION 1
2. ALTERNATIVE INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS FOR
POLLUTION ABATEMENT 1
2.1 MARKET, GOVERNMENT AND INSTRUMENTS
 FOR POLLUTION CONTROL 1
2.1.1 COMMAND AND CONTROLS (CAC) 2
2.1.2 ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS 2
2.1.2.1 PRICE-BASED INSTRUMENTS 2
2.1.2.2 QUANTITY BASED INSTRUMENTS 3
2.1.2.3 MIXED INSTRUMENTS: A PRACTICAL APPROACH 4
2.1.3 COMMUNITY ACTION OR PEOPLE’S PARTICIPATION 5
3. ESTIMATING POLLUTION TAXES FOR AIR
POLLUTION ABATEMENT 7
3.1 COST OF ENVIRONMENTALLY SUSTAINABLE POWER
GENERATION 7
3.2 SHADOW PRICES OF POLLUTANTS AND POLLUTION TAXES 8
4. COLLECTIVE ACTION: A DETERRENT TO COLLUSION BETWEEN
 INDUSTRY AND   CORRUPT  BUREAUCRACY 9
4.1 POLLUTION TAXES, CORRUPTION, BRIBES AND PENALTIES 10
4.2 PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF DAMAGES AND PENALTIES 11
4.3 NON-BENEVOLENT GOVERNMENTS AND STRATEGIC
BEHAVIOR OF ACTIVE GROUPS IN WATER POLLUTION
ABATEMENT 11
4.4 COASE AND BECKER IN PRACTICE: SOME EXAMPLES
FROM INDIA 12
5. CONCLUSIONS 13
6. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 14
REFERENCES 15
APPENDICS 17
6 SANDEE Working Paper No. 48-10VI
TABLES
Table 1: Shadow Prices of Pollutants 24
Table 2: Physical and Monetary Accounts of Air Pollution for an Average
Thermal Power Generating Firm in AP 24
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Pigouvain Tax 25
Figure 2: Pollution Tax and Standards 25
Figure 3: Cosean Bargaining 26
Figure 4: Abatement Function for SPM concentration 26
Figure 5: Abatement Function for SO2 Concentration 26
Figure 6: Abatement Function for NOx Concentration 27
Figure 7: Strategic Behavior of Active Groups in Water Pollution Abatement 27
SANDEE Working Paper No. 48-10 7IX
Abstract
This paper examines the possibility of using economic instruments, especially pollution taxes and
bargaining approaches, as a means to encourage or improve people’s participation in environmental
management in India.  It provides an intuitive description of methods for designing economic
instruments and bargaining approaches. A case study describes the estimation of pollution taxes
for controlling air pollution in thermal power generation in India.  Another case study examining
some bargaining methods that are already in force in India shows their usefulness in controlling
industrial pollution.
Key Words: Pollution tax, Bargaining, Collective action, Transaction costs, Decentralized solutions,
India
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Designing Economic Instruments and Participatory
Institutions for Environmental Management in India
M.N. Murty
1 Since waste disposal service has the public good characteristics, it cannot be disposed by charging a
price for it.
2 See Murty et al. (1999) and World Bank (1999) for details.
3 This alternative is now becoming attractive because of high monitoring and enforcing costs to the
Pollution Control Boards and other governmental agencies and due to corruption in government, espe-
cially in many developing countries.
1.  Introduction
Environmental resources such as air and water have some natural regenerative capacity. They
can therefore accept a certain amount of pollution loads from anthropogenic activities without
any damage. But limits to the natural regenerative capacity of air and water impose a constraint
on both the demand and supply of waste disposal services. Therefore, while industry and
households demand waste disposal services, if this demand exceeds the supply constraints imposed
by the regenerative capacity of the natural resource, it will lead to the degradation in the environment.
Given the ‘public goods’ nature of waste disposal services1, there is no market for this service,
the tendency being for the polluter to take it as a free service. As a result, the demand for waste
disposal services may exceed the natural supply of such services. The challenge then is to come
up with instruments and institutions to bring the demand for waste disposal services down to their
natural levels of supply.
This paper examines the possibilities of using economic instruments, especially pollution taxes
and bargaining approaches, as means to encourage people’s participation in pollution control.
Section 2 provides a brief and somewhat non-technical account of the alternative instruments
and institutions for pollution abatement. Sections 3 and 4 respectively describe available methods
for designing pollution taxes and participatory institutions to control industrial pollution in India.
Section 5 gives the conclusions and policy implications.
2. Alternative Instruments and Institutions for Pollution Abatement
There are three alternative institutions for the control of environmental pollution: (a) market; (b)
government; and (c) community or associations of people. But a practical policy may have to
involve all these institutions2. The general assumption is that market forces alone fail to control
environmental pollution. Although traditional thinking saw the government as an alternative institution
to manage the environment, community action or people’s participation is now gaining prominence
as an alternative to governmental agencies for the management of environmental resources3.
2.1 Market, Government and Instruments for Pollution Control
Non-market policy instruments include command-and-controls (CAC) while market-based
instruments consist of pollution taxes (Pigou, 1920) and marketable pollution permits (Dales,
1968). These are often referred to as economic instruments. The choice between these instruments
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depends both on their efficacy in achieving the target level of emissions as well as on the relative
size of welfare losses they produce (Baumol & Oates, 1988). The government can use either
non-market policy instruments, or market-based or economic instruments, or a combination of
the two as its policy to control pollution.
2.1.1 Command and Controls (CAC)
The CAC instruments are in the form of fines, penalties and threats of legal action for closure of
factories and the possible imprisonment of the owners. The state can use them either to facilitate
the use of specific technologies for purposes of environment management or to realize specific
environmental standards. It is known that the cost of imposing and implementing compliance are
generally higher when the state resorts to CAC instruments rather than economic instruments.
Furthermore, under CAC instruments, there can be no incentives for firms to innovate or invest
in more efficient pollution control technologies or in cleaner process technologies.
2.1.2 Economic Instruments
We can divide economic instruments into three categories: price-based instruments, quantity-
based instruments and hybrid instruments. These instruments are also known as market based
instruments in the literature. Together with the supply-demand forces of the market, they achieve
efficiency in the presence of environmental externalities like air and water pollution.
2.1.2.1  Price-based Instruments
Pigou (1920) was the first to suggest price-based instruments in the form of taxes and subsidies,
when it comes to production and consumption, in order to deal with detrimental and beneficial
environmental externalities. Examples were pollution taxes on a polluting commodity either through
its production (that is, paper, leather, electricity, etc.) or consumption (that is, as cigarettes,
packed foods, etc.) or on a polluting input (such as fuel inputs, chemicals, etc.). It could be a tax
on either the polluting output or the pollution load. The economic instruments could be subsidies
on the commodities the production of which generates environmental benefits (such as a neighbor’s
rose garden which gives off a free benefit in the form of beauty, or forest conservation which
checks soil erosion downstream of a watershed, etc.). We could call the pollution tax or Pigouvian
tax a corrective instrument to realize a socially optimal level of economic activity in the context of
pollution generation.
Pollution tax is considered the price the polluter has to pay for using waste disposal services from
environmental media. Since there is no market for waste disposal services, this price cannot be
determined in the market. In other words, the supply and demand schedules for this service
cannot be observed in the market. However, given the fact that either the public or the state has
property rights to the environmental resource, environmental regulation4 by the government or
the public could make the polluter liable to pay a price for the waste disposal service. The
polluter pays the price in the form of either the cost he incurs for complying with the environmental
regulation or the pollution tax he pays for not complying with the regulation. Therefore, we could
interpret the marginal cost of pollution abatement, or the cost the polluter is willing to incur for
4 The current literature considers regulations by the government and the public respectively as formal and
informal regulation (see World Bank [1999]).
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reducing every successive unit of pollution abatement (MCA), as the demand price of the waste
disposal service.  Figure 1 depicts the demand curve for the waste disposal service as the falling
MCA or demand price with respect to the pollution load generated.  Alternatively, we could see
this curve as depicting the rising MCA with respect to the pollution load reduction.
There is an opportunity cost, or health and other damages, to the public for allowing pollution.
The supply price of the waste disposal service is the price charged to the polluter by the government
or the public for every unit disposal of waste into the environmental media. Therefore, we could
interpret the marginal damages (MD) or the damages from every successive unit of pollution that
the public is willing to bear as the supply price of the waste disposal service. Figure 1 describes
the supply curve of the waste disposal service as the rising marginal damages (MD) or the supply
price with respect to the pollution loads.
We will now illustrate the Pigouvian tax/subsidy framework diagrammatically. In Figure 1, the
MCA and MD respectively represent the marginal cost of abatement and marginal damages
from pollution.  Em and E* stand respectively for pollution loads with and without tax instrument
while ‘t’ stands for the pollution tax. With the polluters using the pollution abatement technologies,
the optimality or maximization of welfare requires the pollution to be reduced up to the level at
which the MCA equals the MD as Figure 1 shows. If the government levies a tax equivalent to ‘t’
on per unit of pollution on the polluter based on the polluter pay principle, the polluter has an
incentive to reduce pollution up to the optimal level, E*, in the free market. The polluter has two
choices: pay a tax equivalent to E*EREm or reduce the pollution load from Em to E* incurring the
cost equal to E*ESEm. If the polluter reduces the pollution, s/he will save a cost equal to ERS as
in Figure 1. Therefore, given the tax rate equivalent to ‘t’, the polluter chooses to reduce pollution
rather than pay the tax.
A large number of people feel the damages from pollution, which is more so in the case of water and
air pollution. Therefore, the damages from a unit of pollution at margin are the sum of marginal
damages to all the affected people. Hence, to design a Pigouvian tax, we require information about
the abatement cost functions of polluting firms and damage functions for all the affected people. The
cost of collecting information to estimate these functions can be prohibitively high. For example, the
pollution of a major river like the Ganges or an urban air shed like Delhi can affect millions of
people. It may not be economically feasible to design a Pigouvian tax in such instances.
2.1.2.2 Quantity Based Instruments
D.H. Dales (1968) has suggested an alternative to the pollution tax in a system of tradable
pollution rights for the management of the environment. He has proposed that property rights
should be extended to the use and abuse of the environment and that such entitlement should be
offered for sale to the highest bidder. This system is like a tax in order to achieve the specified
environmental target at a minimum cost. For example, in the case of air pollution, this approach
first determines the optimal level pollution in a given geographical area. The authorities then
divide this level of pollution to be tolerated into a number of permits among the various polluting
units within the area (either by free distribution or by auctioning). Firms which are already
comparatively more efficient in controlling their wastes or pollution (that is, the ones that face a
lower unit cost for pollution control) may continue their original level of production and emissions.
But they may have some extra pollution permits (or entitlements) to spare. They can sell such
extra permits to firms which are less efficient in controlling their wastes (that is, the ones that face
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a higher unit cost for pollution abatement). Provided monitoring is possible and effective, the net
result is that total pollution is kept within the prescribed levels. The more efficient firms will sell
their surplus permits to less efficient firms which require more permits in order to continue with
their original production plans. This process creates a market for pollution permits in which
trading in permits takes place up to the point at which the aggregate supply of permits is equal to
the aggregate demand for permits and the equilibrium permit price is equal to the marginal cost of
abatement to each firm.
2.1.2.3  Mixed Instruments: A Practical Approach
In practice, we should have a mixture of both command and controls (CAC) and economic
instruments.  Economic instruments alone may not be feasible because their imposition requires a
lot of information on firm level emission, technology, etc., which are not easy to come by.
Command and control measures alone are inefficient because they may result in the use of costly
pollution abatement technologies by firms. Similarly, it is difficult to estimate the damages to
affected people in the case of the pollution tax or to know beforehand the optimal level of
pollution in the case of tradable permits, which pose practical problems with regard to the design
of economic instruments. Instead, setting pollution standards by Pollution Control Boards and
using either the pollution tax or the marketable permits instrument to induce the polluting industry
to meet those standards is a hybrid method, which combines both regulatory and economic
instruments. However, in such cases, the criteria for fixing environmental standards can become
a subject of debate, that is, whether they have to be decided on a scientific basis or on the basis
of a referendum or political process. A scientific approach would require that they be based on
evidence concerning the effects of air pollution on health or of polluted water on fish and human
life. Alternatively, the community or society concerned could decide on them through a political
process, which involves a referendum on alternative sets of pollution standards. Among other
issues to be sorted out would be the question of whether the standards should be fixed at the
state levels or the national and whether the standards should constitute a compromise between
industry and people, etc.
Once we fix environmental standards on an apriori basis, we would be able to avoid the difficult
problem of estimating the damages to all the affected people from pollution in order to design the
economic instruments. However, we need an estimate of the pollution abatement cost. It is
economically feasible to obtain an estimate of pollution abatement costs because (a) the polluters
may normally be much less in number than the affected people; and (b) we can obtain tangible
information about technologies used by the polluters, the pollution loads and the levels of
production. Using firm-level data on pollution loads, we can estimate costs of abatement and
production levels and the pollution abatement cost functions using econometric techniques. Given
the environmental standards and the estimated marginal abatement cost function, we can fix a
rate of tax such that the firms will automatically have an incentive to reduce pollution in order to
meet the standards. This is explained in Figure 2.
Let us assume the emission standard is OE. Let the current rate of the firm’s emission be OD. If
the firm has to reduce the pollution load from D to E as per the environmental standard, the rate
of tax equivalent to OA will make the firm do so. The firm has an incentive to abate pollution
rather than opting to pay the tax because the cost of abatement given by the area BFDE in the
Figure is lower than the tax liability given by the area BCDE.  Similarly, firms can use marketable
pollution permits to obtain the reduction in pollution loads as required by the environmental
SANDEE Working Paper No. 48-10 5
standards. Researchers have shown that the taxes standard or the tradable permits and emission
standards method result in the adoption of least cost technologies by the firms5.
There can be many situations in which command and control instruments are unavoidable. In
some cases, the social cost of a particular activity depends on factors that are beyond the control
of those directly involved. For example, the effects of the discharge of effluents into a river may
depend upon the conditions of the river at that particular point in time. Similarly, stagnant air can
trap pollutants, perhaps even collect them, which becomes hazardous. Therefore, exogenous
meteorological conditions could contribute to occasional crises requiring temporary emergency
measures in the form of command and controls. Pollution tax rates cannot be changed at short
notice to deal with such emergencies. Even if the government were to effect changes, there
would be a time-lag before the polluters respond to the change. Marketable permits also result in
long-term adjustments in environmental quality and are not suitable for emergencies. The
government, on the other hand, can quickly activate command and control measures to deal with
more than normal amounts of emissions arising out of emergencies since such measures do not
require extra monitoring. Therefore, in practice, neither economic instruments nor command and
controls alone constitute an optimal environmental strategy. Hence, the cost-minimizing strategy
to realize given environmental standards is a mixed strategy consisting of economic instruments
and command and controls.
2.1.3  Community Action or People’s Participation
According to conventional thinking, when it comes to environmental management, the government
has the power to design and implement the command and control measures and the economic
instruments described above. This is on the assumption that the government is benevolent and
that there are supporting legal and other instruments. In many countries, however, the government
may not be benevolent and/or the required environmental laws may not be in place. Moreover,
even if such laws were in place, they might be ineffective due to a variety of reasons. In such
instances, it is important to look for institutional alternatives to government in order to control
environmental externalities. The alternatives can be (a) collective action on the part of all the
agents responsible for managing the environment; and (b) a purely market option.
Coase (1960) has argued that many types of externalities can be optimally controlled by creating
specific property rights among the concerned agents. Property rights mean either the people’s
right to clean water and air or the producer’s and consumer’s right to pollute. We can state this
important finding of Coase, now known as the Coase theorem, as follows: consider the situation
of an externality such as pollution. There are two agents involved here, namely, the generator and
the affected parties. Given the initial property right to any resource either to the generator of the
externality or to the affected party, if the cost of bargaining is zero, the bargaining between the
two parties results in the optimal control of the externality. The final outcome of the bargaining is
invariant vis-à-vis the initial property right, that is, whether the right to clean air is vested in the
affected people or whether the right to pollute is given to the polluter. Figure 3 further explains
this result. In this Figure, we measure the pollution load along the x-axis and the marginal cost of
pollution abatement (MCA) and the marginal damages (MD) along the y-axis. It gives the optimal
pollution load as OE. For pollution loads higher and lower than OE, there are incentives for
gainful bargaining between the polluter and the affected party. If the polluter has the right to
pollute beyond OE, then the MD is higher than MCA for the pollution loads and the affected
5 For more details, see Baumol and Oates, 1988.
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party has an incentive to bribe the polluter at any rate lower than MD for a unit reduction in
pollution while the polluter has an incentive to accept the bribe at any rate higher than the MCA.
Therefore, bargaining between the two parties takes place until the pollution load is reduced to
OE. Similarly, since MCA is higher than MD for the pollution loads lower than OE, the polluter
has an incentive to offer bribes to the affected party at any rate lower than MCA while the
affected party has an incentive to accept bribes at any rate higher than MD. Again, the bargaining
between them leads to the optimal pollution load OE.
The Coasean bargaining theorem may not work in practice to control environmental externalities
for several reasons. First of all, in reality, the transaction costs or costs of bargaining are not zero
but positive. We can show that with positive costs of bargaining, the resulting pollution load
through bargaining can be higher or lower than the optimal pollution load ‘OE’ depending on the
initial property rights.
This means that with the positive transaction costs, the final result will no longer be invariant with
respect to the initial property rights. Secondly, one of the key assumptions in the Coasean solution
is that the value of property rights captures all the externalities and that there are incentives for
gainful bargaining. This can work well for externalities on a smaller scale or local externalities of
the type described by Coase such as a building that blocks the windmill’s air currents or a
confectioner’s machine that disturbs the doctor’s quiet, etc. However, many environmental
externalities occur on a grander scale with a large number of receivers and, many times, a good
number of generators (as, for example, in the case of the pollution of a river and the atmosphere)
which makes defining property rights and facilitating bargaining difficult. One way to deal with
this problem is to create a common property right to the river of all the affected people as one
group and an association of polluters of the river as another group so that the bargaining to
reduce river pollution can take place between the two parties. The third problem with the Coasean
bargaining again arises in the context of defining property rights for an environmental resource.
An environmental resource is a stock affecting the welfare of both the present and future
generations. Capitalization of future benefits from this resource is not possible because property
rights to future generations of affected people cannot be defined. One approach to taking care of
future generations is to consider the government as its representative. The government can compete
in the market on behalf of future generations for the environmental property rights and to pay for
these rights by issuing a debt which the future generations must service. Another approach to
environmental property rights of future generation is based on the assumption that the present
generation has a bequest motive towards the future and wants to bequeath to the future the
preserved resources. However, both government intervention and bequest motive are outside
the scope of Coase’s property rights approach.
In the Coasean bargaining solution, the government has a minimal role to play. Its role is only to
create property rights and to protect them while free-market bargaining between the agents will
optimally control the externality. Various institutional alternatives now considered in the literature
for the control of environmental externalities contain some elements of the market mechanism
with the government playing only a limited role. Given the ineffectiveness of government in
environmental management and the high transaction costs of government instruments, it is imperative
to look for new institutions to define and implement property rights for environmental externalities.
Researchers have found collective action by all the agents involved to be one such new institution.
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3. Estimating Pollution Taxes for Air Pollution Abatement
The environment provides waste disposal services as productive inputs to industry. Given
environmental regulation, producers place a value on these inputs just as they value other
conventional inputs such as labour, man-made capital and materials. Environmental regulations
meant to ensure environmentally sustainable industrial development impose a cost on industry.
UN methodology for integrated environmental and economic accounting (1993) calls this cost a
maintenance cost or the cost to the industry for maintaining the quality of the environment at its
natural regenerative level. As explained in Section 2, we need environmental regulation via pollution
taxes or other instruments in order to make the industry internalise this cost. There is a need to
estimate shadow prices of environmental inputs in order to arrive at the maintenance cost to the
industry and to estimate the pollution abatement cost functions for the purpose of designing
pollution taxes.
We can use a model describing the technology of power generation as one of jointly producing
good output, that is power, and bad output, that is pollution load, in order to estimate the shadow
prices and marginal pollution abatement cost functions of industrial pollutants. The theory of
production calls this model the output distance function. The  production relation expressed in
the reduced form as the output distance function indirectly considers the processes of waste
generation or material balance6. This model defines the producer demand price for waste disposal
services from the environment as the opportunity cost in terms of good output foregone in order
to reduce bad output. We may regard this price as the shadow price of pollution or the marginal
cost of pollution abatement. Using the estimate of this model, we can obtain estimates of the
marginal cost of abatement of industrial pollutants. Appendix A describes the output distance
function and its estimate for the thermal power generating industry in the state of Andhra Pradesh
(AP), India7. Table 1 provides estimates of shadow prices of pollutants SPM, SO2, and NOx for
thermal power generation in AP.
3.1 Cost of Environmentally Sustainable Power Generation
Environmental standards such as the Minimum National Standards (MINAS) of India or the
WHO standards are scientifically designed instrument to capture the natural regenerative capacity
of environmental media. Therefore, we may interpret the cost to the industry of complying with
these standards as the cost of environmentally sustainable industrial development. One has to
account for this cost in the measurement of Green GDP or in the environmentally corrected net
national product (ENNP).  We could define the ENNP as8
ENNP = C + Pk ∇K  + Pn ∇N                                                                                     (1)
where C, ∇K, and  ∇N represent respectively consumption, changes in manmade capital, and
natural or environmental capital while Pk and Pn are prices of manmade and natural capital.
The first two terms in equation (1) constitute the conventional NNP while the last term accounts
for the value of change in natural resource stock (i.e., change in environmental quality) due to
6 Murty and Russell (2000) have shown that there could be problems in defining the shadow prices of
pollution and finding the trade-off between pollution and output along the production frontier in this
model.  However, they have also shown that modeling abatement as an intermediary input does yield a
positive trade-off and facilitates the definition of shadow prices of pollution.
7 See Murty and Gulati, for details (2007).
8 See Witzman (1976), Dasgupta and Maler (1998), and Murty and Surender Kumar (2004).
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various economic activities during the year. The UN methodology suggests the development of
physical and monetary accounts of natural capital as satellite accounts to conventional national
accounts in order to estimate Pn ∇N.  It is necessary to develop time series of physical accounts
of ambient quality of atmosphere, water resources and forest cover in order to estimate ∇N.
For example, in the case of air pollution, we could measure ∇N as the pollution load of SPM that
is in excess of the pollution load corresponding to safe ambient standards. In the case of CO2,
∇N could be simply the pollution load generated because it adds to the stock of CO2 already
present in the atmosphere.
Table 2 provides physical and monetary accounts of air pollution for a representative firm belonging
to the AP power-generating industry during a given year. We estimated the annual cost of reducing
the pollution levels of SPM, SO2, and NOx from the current levels to zero in all thermal power
generating plants in AP as Rs. 534 million.  We could interpret this cost as the cost of environmentally
sustainable thermal power generation in AP.
3.2 Shadow Prices of Pollutants and Pollution Taxes
Estimation of pollution taxes using the Taxes-Standards Method requires estimates of the marginal
cost of pollution abatement and data about pollution standards. It is possible to interpret the
shadow prices of pollutants that we report in Table 1 as the marginal costs of pollution abatement.
Using the estimated distance function in Appendix A for thermal power generation in AP, we
could calculate plant specific shadow prices. We could obtain the marginal cost of pollution
abatement function for each pollutant by finding a relationship between the shadow price of
pollutant and pollution load. The marginal cost of pollution abatement of a plant depends on
output, pollution and plant-specific characteristics among others. Specifying this relationship as
stochastic, we estimate the marginal cost of the pollution abatement function for SPM, SO2 and
NOx separately as  given in equations 2, 3 and 4 respectively with regard to thermal power
generation in AP.  In these equations, the dependent variables are shadow prices or marginal
costs of pollutants (SPMS, SO2S and NOxS) while the independent variables are electricity
output (OUT), pollution concentrations (SPMC, SO2C, NOxC), plant specific dummy variables
(Di, i = 1….4) and time (TIME).  There is a rising marginal cost with respect to pollution reduction
SPM
In SPMP = 11.82 + 0.255* In (OUT) - 1.02* (SPMC) + 0.705*DI  - 0.308*D2 - 0.57*D3
                  (22.80)  (2.92)                   (-13.71)              (2.96)         (1.00)         (-3.31)
0.108*D4 - 0.22* TIME
(0.55)         (13.71)                                                                                                    2
Adjusted R2 = 7822
Figure 4 depicts the marginal pollution abatement cost function for SPM. y-axis measures the
marginal cost of abatement while x-axis measures the SPM concentration.
SO2
In SO2P = 9.33 - 1.012* In (OUT) - 0.835* In (SO2C) - 02.16*DI  - 2.27*D2 - 1.69*D3
                  (27.24)  (11.73)             (-14.85)              (-8.37)         (-6.68)         (-10.13)
0.352*D4 - 0.073* TIME
(-1.47)         (-3.01)                                                                                                    2
Adjusted R2 = 0.8196
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Using the above marginal abatement cost of functions and using the MINAS Stack Emission
Standards of 115, 80 and 80 milligrams per NM3 respectively for SPM, SO2 and NOx, we
compute the tax rates as Rs. 2099, 20519 and 5554 per tonne of emissions. If the state of AP
levies these taxes on the power-generating company, the company has incentives to internalize
the cost of pollution abatement as we discussed in Section 2.
4.   Collective Action: A Deterrent to Collusion Between  Industry and   Corrupt
      Bureaucracy9
Governments of many developing countries, perhaps some in even developed countries, are
non-benevolent, so that the responsibility of dealing with market failure and achieving developmental
objectives cannot be completely left to their discretion. When it comes to issues such as the
control of externalities like environmental pollution, the corrupt bureaucracy of developing countries
often colludes with external diseconomy- creating agents to increase the externality problem
rather than to control it. In such situations, there is no option left to the parties affected by the
externality but to fall back on either collective action or political influence in order to deal with the
bureaucracy and the perpetrator of the externality. As already explained in Section 2, Coase
(1960) argues that given the initial property rights of both the externality generator and the receivers,
the costless bargaining between the parties in a free market will result in the optimal control of the
externality, the final outcome being independent of the initial allocation of property rights. Becker
(1983) has shown that the political influence exerted by pressure groups can have an impact
similar to that exerted by a benevolent government to deal with market failure. To quote him,
“The same analysis of competition among pressure groups, without the introduction of the social
welfare function or benevolent government, explains expenditures on defense and other public
goods, taxes on pollution, and other government activities that raise efficiency, even when some
groups are hurt by the activities” (Becker, 1983).
However, as Coase points out, bargaining is not always costless. In the world of Coase and
Becker, therefore, transaction costs are very much a factor to be considered. But even with
transaction costs, there can be significant net welfare gains from collective action, and the case
for collective action will be reinforced if the government is non-benevolent. Take the case of
industrial water pollution abatement in India. More than twenty years of environmental legislation
in India have not produced a pollution tax while the CAC methods used so far by the Indian
government have not made a dent in industrial pollution control. This has also been the case with
many other developing countries. One important reason for this is the absence of awareness
among people about the extent of damage from pollution and their inability to organize themselves
into pressure groups to participate in the management of pollution abatement.  In such a situation,
the industry and the non-benevolent bureaucracy have incentives to collude in the violation of
environmental standards. The industry can bribe the regulator to either over report its effluent
9 This section is drawn mainly from Murty (1995b).
NOx
In NOxP = 4.94 + 1.21* In (OUT) - 0.63* In (NOxC) + 3.88*DI  - 2.41*D2 - 0.93*D3
                  (14.67)  (13.48)             (-10.67)               (-16.58)       (-7.50)     (-5.23)
0.108*D4 - 0.22* TIME
(6.34)         (10.8)                                                                                                    2
Adjusted R2 = 0.8062
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quality or not report it at all. There are several agents involved in the political economy of industrial
pollution abatement: the affected people, elected representatives, the bureaucracy and the industry.
Incentives exist for a sub-coalition of agents such as a coalition of affected people and elected
representatives or another coalition of bureaucracy and industry. Such conditions are fertile grounds
for the emergence of politically active pressure groups. As Murty (1995b) has shown, competition
among these pressure groups may result in the optimal control of pollution.
4.1 Pollution Taxes, Corruption, Bribes and Penalties
In the case of non-benevolent government, which might be the case in many developing countries,
the mere enactment of environmental laws does not guarantee their actual execution or
implementation. There are many views on the whys and wherefores of corruption in bureaucracy.
According to one view, in the pyramidal structure of bureaucracy, corruption increases as one
goes down the ladder while it is virtually zero at the top. Opportunities for corruption arise when
the principal officer delegates enforcement authority to officers lower down in the cadre (Rose-
Ackerman, 1978; Milgrom and Roberts, 1988). In such a system, checks and balances operate
to minimize corruption because the probability exists that the bribe-taking junior officer can be
apprehended in the act and penalized by the superior officer. Mukherjee and Png  (1994) have
shown, on the other hand, that in a pyramidal structure of corruption, the penalty for bribe-
taking, or compensation for the honesty, of lower-ranking officers that regulators might resort to
have only uncertain effects on pollution abatement. Another view posits that corruption is distributed
(perhaps evenly) among officers of all ranks of the bureaucracy. According to this view, there is
tacit agreement among the officers to share the bribe collected once a lower-ranking officer, say
an inspector, accepts the bribe. Some would argue that it is bureaucratic corruption of this form
that is rampant in many developing countries. In India, the commonly held public view subscribes
to this latter theory. The third view sees corruption as a matter of collusion between the bureaucracy
and the politicians (that is, members of the legislature), the motive for collusion on the part of the
elected representatives arising from a desire to seek a profit from the power granted to them
constitutionally. This type of corruption can take place in the societies where the public is not
politically aware or organized to deal with erring legislators, which is the case with the emerging
democracies of many developing countries. Reins on the latter two types of corrupt bureaucracy
are only possible through civil society activism, especially by people who are the direct victims of
industrial pollution.
In the case of democracies where people affected by an externality are politically active, they can
influence their elected representatives to stem bureaucratic corruption. They can bring pressure
on their elected representatives, say, a municipal committee in the case of a local externality, to
impose penalties on bribe-taking bureaucracy. Alternatively, they can organize themselves into a
pressure group to take legal action against the colluding elected representatives, bureaucracy
and industry. Thus, depending on the way corruption actually takes place, there can be sub-
coalitions of agents who play a role in industrial water pollution abatement: a coalition of affected
people and elected representatives and a coalition of industry and bureaucracy. In an alternative
scenario, on the other hand, it might be the affected people alone on one side who are opposed
by a coalition of industry, bureaucracy and elected representatives on the other. Collective action
on the part of the affected people moreover has transaction costs in the form of time devoted and
efforts made to organize in order to detect the violation of environmental standards by a coalition
of bureaucracy and industry and to effect legal action.
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4.2 Public Perception of Damages and Penalties
Consider a situation in which four sets of agents are involved in industrial pollution abatement: (a)
affected public; (b) elected representatives of the public (say a municipal committee); (c)
bureaucracy (i.e., the executive body implementing the environmental legislation); and (d) industry.
In a situation where there is no attempt by the affected public to check the pollution, the
bureaucracy and industry could interpret it as an invitation to violate the environmental standards.10
Considering that environmental legislation levies a pollution tax, the industry has an incentive to
bribe the bureaucracy, at a rate less than the tax per unit of effluent for over-reporting its effluent
quality. A false certification of higher effluent quality by bureaucracy helps the industry to shun its
responsibility towards meeting the standards. The extent to which the affected public can make
the bureaucracy and industry comply with environmental standards depends upon its degree of
perception of damage and the influence it can exert either through civil society activism, or elected
representatives, or both. The degree to or the probability with which the affected people perceive
the damage and are able to rein in the bribe-taking bureaucracy and non-complying industry
depends upon the amount of time and effort they are able to devote to politically organize
themselves. Politically active affected people can exert pressure on their elected representatives
to impose penalties on the bureaucracy and industry if they are caught colluding to violate the set
standards.
4.3 Non-benevolent Governments and Strategic Behavior of Active Groups in
Water Pollution Abatement
If the bureaucracy or the regulator is corrupt, incentives exist for the formation of sub-coalitions
of the various agents who are party to industrial water pollution11. As explained earlier, it is
possible that the affected people and the municipal committee will act in tandem. Just as people
need the help of their representatives to deal with the industry and the bureaucracy, the
representatives require the people’s support to get re-elected. Similarly, it is possible that the
industry and bureaucracy have incentives to collude in the form of sharing the cost saved from
non-compliance with environmental standards by the industry. We resort to this simple bifurcation
of the domain of political action into two sub-coalitions in order to highlight the effect of the
political activity of pressure groups on industrial water pollution abatement. However, in actuality,
other sub-coalitions are possible and we can attempt a similar analysis with them. Thus we have
two groups of agents: Group I, which is made up of the affected people and the municipal
committee, with a strategy of time devoted for political organization, W, and cost function, G1.
Group II is made up of the industry and bureaucracy with a strategy of level of environmental
quality attained by industry, E, and cost function G2. The cost to each group depends on the W,
E and penalties and bribes12. Given penalties and bribes, Group I minimizes G1 with respect to W
given E while Group II minimizes G2 with respect to E given W. The strategic behavior of Groups
I and II yields the reaction
10 We confine ourselves here to the second view of corruption for a detailed analysis. It is possible to
undertake a similar analysis with respect to the third view on corruption.
11 The structure of corruption in bureaucracy assumed here is different from the one considered in some
recent work in this area. This study assumes that the bribes that the bureaucracy accepts are shared by all
cadres of officers while some recent studies consider a pyramidal structure of corruption (where corrup-
tion reduces as one climbs up the bureaucratic ladder, becoming virtually zero at the top).
12 See Appendix B.
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As Figure 4 illustrates, we can define the equilibrium strategies of a two-person Nash non-
cooperative game as W* (E* ) and E* (W* ) which are given by the intersection of curves depicting
the reaction functions of Groups I and II. Increasing the penalties on industry and bureaucracy
have the effects of increasing the environmental quality E, given W, and decreasing the time
devoted to political activity W, given the environmental quality E. The equilibrium environmental
quality of a two-person Nash non-cooperative game increases as the penalties increase. Thus,
there are welfare gains from increasing penalties either in the form of a decrease in damages to
environmental quality, or in the form of a saving in cost of political activity. Since there are costs
to the industry from increasing E, there can be net welfare gains from increasing penalties so long
as the incremental damage reductions to affected parties are higher than the incremental cost to
the industry. In fact, the condition that the marginal cost of abatement to industry be equal to the
marginal reduction in damages determines the optimal rates of penalties and optimal environmental
quality.  However, in the current framework, the statutorily fixed environmental standards determine
the optimal rates of penalties. This analysis therefore shows that even if the government is non-
benevolent, concerned parties could achieve the statutorily fixed environmental quality through
political competition13.
4.4 Coase and Becker in Practice: Some Examples from India
Empirical findings of a survey of some industrial estates in India14 provide evidence for the
effectiveness of active pressure groups when it comes to controlling the externality of industrial
pollution. Data from this survey provides insights into empirical aspects of the economic and
non-economic processes that shape collective action vis-a-vis industrial water pollution abatement.
The data shows that collective action of various agents such as people affected by water pollution,
elected representatives, industries, the NGOs and the government was responsible for triggering
the processes that led to the control of industrial water pollution. The survey shows that factories
in the industrial estates were discharging untreated waste water which deposited on the surface
of land and in the local streams, resulting in the degradation of cultivable lands and the contamination
of ground water sources. But while the local people had suffered from crop and cattle losses in
addition to contracting a variety of water-borne diseases, the government had failed to take
cognizance of the damages, which appear to support the local people’s view that there was
collusion between the factories and government officials to share the cost saved by factories
from non-compliance with pollution standards.
The initial efforts by local people to stem the pollution either through persuasion or even through
physical threats to factory owners did not yield any results. An organized group of local people
therefore resorted to legal action by filing public litigation cases in courts. There are now a
number of successful public litigation cases dealing with industrial water pollution abatement in
India. In one such public litigation case (Supreme Court,1990) concerning an industrial estate in
Hyderabad, India, the Supreme Court ordered the constitution of an expert committee (NEERI,
1991) to study the problem of water pollution and to make recommendations regarding a) the
extent of compensation to be paid to the affected people by the industries; and b) the remedial
measures that the industries and the government had to take in order to prevent water pollution
in the future. After receiving the Committee’s recommendations, the Supreme Court directed the
factories to pay compensation to the affected people and asked the government to take action as
13 See Murty (1995b) for proof.
14 We base this on a survey conducted in 1996 by the Institute of Economic Growth, Delhi, of seventeen
highly water-polluting industries in India.
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per existing environmental laws against the factories so that they comply with pollution standards.
The political organization of the affected people in this particular instance also enlisted the active
support of their elected representatives (members of the local state assembly and Union parliament)
in the interest of industrial water pollution abatement. Elected representatives in turn have made
local pollution control problems part of their election manifestos. There was, therefore, a coalition
of affected people and elected representatives to deal with a coalition of factories and bureaucracy
to control water pollution in this industrial area. The emergence of such an institutionalized setting,
in which there was competition among pressure groups or interest groups, have resulted in the
adoption of common effluent plant technology (CETP) by factories in each of the industrial
estates. Collective action by the affected people has induced the factories to organize themselves
as a club to construct and manage a CETP15. It is also interesting to note that there are many
instances now in India where the government plays a catalytic role rather than its conventional
coercive role in environmental management by providing financial and other incentives to a club
of factories to install a CEPT16.
5. Conclusions
Economic instruments such as pollution taxes and marketable permits, on the one hand, and
institutions facilitating people’s participation, on the other, are two efficient methods for controlling
environmental pollution. Coase’s bargaining methods with participatory institutions result in
decentralized solutions which carry significant savings in transaction costs as opposed to the
Pigouvian taxes. There is enough empirical evidence from the developing countries to support this
form of environmental regulation through people’s participation (Murty et al., 1999; WB, 1999).
The method for estimating pollution taxes for the thermal power-generating industry in India
described in this paper underscores the informational requirements for designing such taxes.
There is a cost associated with environmentally sustainable industrial development that the UN
methodology of Integrated Environmental and Economic Accounting calls the maintenance cost.
We could consider this cost as the cost to the industry of complying with the environmental
standards taking into account the natural regenerative capacity of environmental media. This
paper uses a method in the theory of production which describes pollution as a bad output that is
jointly produced with the good output in order to estimate the maintenance cost. We use panel
data for 8 years from 5 coal-fired thermal power plants in the state of Andhra Pradesh, India, for
the estimation. We estimate the shadow prices of pollutants and the cost of pollution abatement
for AP GENCO. We calculate the pollution taxes that would make the thermal power plants in
AP comply with the MINAS stack standards as Rs. 2099, 20519 and 5554 respectively for
SPM, SO2 and NOx.
15 Adun Roud, of the Centre for Development and Environment, of the University of Oslo, while comment-
ing on an earlier version of this paper, noted that this kind of collective action had actually taken place
among people affected by industrial pollution along the Hoogly River in the southern parts of Calcutta
before a well-known environmental lawyer M.C. Mehta actually brought the cases to the Supreme Court
of India.  The court rulings for 1994 urged several heavily water polluting units along the Hoogly River to
install the required pollution control equipment.  Later, the West Bengal Pollution Control Board insisted
on implementing the court rulings by threatening to close down 12 major polluters unless they took
significant steps to reduce water pollution.  Thus, he feels this is the first instance where collective action
succeeded.  However, he observes that the relatively strong political influence of the industrial lobby vis-
à-vis the relatively weak position of the environmental lobby significantly influences the speed of the
environmental process.
16 Mishra and Murty, 1999.
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We measure the political activity of people affected by an externality in terms of a fraction or the
number of people who perceive damages from the externality or the probability at which they
can apprehend the colluding industry or the bureaucracy. There is a cost to political activity in
terms of the time devoted to it by the affected people. A sub-coalition of affected people and
elected representatives can impose penalties on the bureaucracy and industry if this coalition can
prove that the bureaucracy was accepting bribes and if they can prove that the industry was
over-stating the effluent quality.
The Nash non-cooperative game among the sub-coalitions of agents yields an equilibrium
environmental quality which is superior to the environmental quality without political activity. As
the rates of penalties increase, the equilibrium environmental quality of the game increases. There
can be rates of penalties and a level of political activity with respect to which governments/
concerned parties can set statutorily fixed environmental standards. Moreover, the rate of penalty
required to achieve the statutory environmental quality through competition between the pressure
groups in the case of a non-benevolent government is the same as the rate of tax required, using
the taxes standard approach, with a benevolent government.
Out of two approaches to environment management described in this paper, economic instruments
score well in situations of good and responsible governments and no resource constraints on
environmental management. However, this is not usually the scenario currently found in many
developing countries. Community action arising out of competition among pressure groups
discussed in this paper scores well for the environmental management in developing countries.
Participatory approaches with decentralized solutions result in the savings of transaction costs of
environmental management and work well even if government is inefficient. Even in countries
with good governments, cost effective environmental management requires using of a combination
of economic instruments and participatory approaches.
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APPENDICS
Appendix A: Output Distance Function and Estimation for Thermal Power
Generation in AP
Suppose that a firm employs a vector of inputs x∈ ℜN+ to produce a vector of outputs y∈ ℜM+,
and ℜ N+ and ℜ M+ are non-negative N- and M-dimensional Euclidean spaces, respectively.  Let
P(x) be the feasible output set for the given input vector x and L(y) the input requirement set for
a given output vector y.  Now the technology set is defined as
T = {(y,x) ∈  ℜM+N+ y ∈ P(x)}.                                                     (A1)
 The output distance function is defined as,
DO (x,y) = min{λ > 0:(y/λ) ∈ P(x)}    x ∈  ℜN+ .                                                         (A2)
Equation (A2) characterizes the output possibility set by the maximum equi-proportional expansion
of all outputs consistent with the technology set (A1).
The assumptions about the disposability of outputs become very important in the context of a
firm producing both good and bad outputs. The normal assumption of strong or free disposability
about the technology implies,
if (y1 , y2 ) ∈ P(x) and 0 ≤ y1 * ≤ y1 , 0 ≤ y2* ≤ y2 ⇒ (y1*,y*2 ) ∈ P(x).
It means we can reduce some outputs given the other outputs  constant.  This assumption may
exclude important production processes such as undesirable outputs like pollution.  The assumption
of weak disposability is relevant to a discussion of such production processes.  The assumption
of weak disposability implies,
if y ∈ P(x) and 0  ≤λ ≤ 1 ⇒  λy ∈ P(x).
It means that a firm can reduce the bad output only by decreasing simultaneously the output of
desirable produce.
The idea of deriving shadow prices using output and input distance functions and the duality
results is originally from Shephard (1970). A study by Fare, Grosskopf and Nelson (1990) is the
first to compute shadow prices using the distance function and non-parametric linear programming
methods.  Fare et al.  (1993) was the first study to derive the shadow prices of undesirable
outputs using the output distance function.
The derivation of absolute shadow prices for bad outputs using distance function requires the
assumption that the one observed output price is the shadow price. Let y1 denote the good
output and assume that the observed good output price (r1
0) equals its absolute shadow price
(r1
s) (i.e., for m=1, r1
0=r1
s). Fare et al. (1993) have shown that the absolute shadow prices for
each observation of undesirable output (m=2,.....,M) can  be derived as17,
The shadow prices reflect the trade-off between desirable and undesirable outputs at the actual
mix of outputs, which may or may not be consistent with the maximum allowable under regulation
(Fare et al., 1993).  Further, the shadow prices do not require that plants operate on the production
frontier.
A
17 See Fare (1988) for derivation.
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Estimation Procedure and Data
In order to estimate the shadow prices of pollutants (bad outputs) for thermal power generation
in Andhra Pradesh using equation (A3), we need to estimate the parameters of output distance
function.  We give the trans-log functional form18 used for estimating these functions as follows:
ln Do(x, y) = α0 + ∑βn ln xn +∑ am ln ym + 1/2∑ ∑ βnn’ (ln xn) (ln xn’) + 1/2 ∑ ∑ αmm’ (ln ym)(y
m’)+∑∑γnm(ln xn)(ln ym)+ι 1d1+ ι 2d2 + ι 3d3 + ι d4                                                               (A4)
where x and y are respectively, Nx1 and Mx1 vectors of inputs and outputs. There are three
inputs: capital, labor, and energy and four outputs: good output, electricity, and bad outputs,
SPM, NOx , and SO2, while di is the dummy variable representing the plant. We use a linear
programming technique to estimate the parameters of a deterministic translog output distance
function (Aigner and Chu, 1968).  We accomplish this by solving the problem,
max ∑ [ln Do (x , y ) - ln 1],                                                                                            (A5)
subject to
(i)  ln Do (x, y) ≤ 0
(ii) (∂ ln Do (x, y))/(∂ ln y1) ³ ≤ 0
(iii) (∂ ln Do (x, y))/(∂ ln yi) ≤ 0
(iv) (∂ ln Do (x, y))/(∂ ln xi) ≤ 0
(v) ∑ αm = 1
∑ αmm =∑γnm = 0
(vi) αmm = αmm
βnn = βnn
Here the first output is desirable and the rest of (M-1) outputs are undesirable. The objective
function minimizes the sum of the deviations of individual observations from the frontier of
technology. Since the distance function takes a value of less than or equal to one, the natural
logarithm of the distance function is less than or equal to zero, and the deviation from the frontier
is less than or equal to zero. Hence, we maximize the objective function implying the minimization
of the sum of deviations of individual observations from the frontier of technology. The constraints
in (i) restrict the individual observations to be on or below the frontier of the technology. The
constraints in (ii) ensure that the desirable output has a non-negative shadow price. The constraints
in (iv) restrict that the shadow prices of bad outputs are non-positive, i.e., weak disposability of
bad outputs whereas the restrictions in (v) are the derivative property of the output distance
function with respect to inputs, i.e., the derivatives of output distance function with respect to
inputs is non-increasing.  The constraints in (v) impose homogeneity of degree +1 in outputs
(which also ensures that technology satisfies the weak disposability of outputs). Finally, constraints
in (vi) impose symmetry. There is no constraint imposed to ensure non-negative values to the
shadow prices of undesirable outputs.
18 Many earlier studies for estimating shadow prices of pollutants have used the translog functional form for
estimating the output distance function. These include Pitman (1981), Fare et al. (1990), and Coggins and
Swinton (1996).
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Table A1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in the Study
We estimate the output distance function described above by considering electricity as a good
output and pollution loads of SPM, NOx, and SO2 as bad outputs using data about thermal
power generation by APGENCO in the State of Andhra Pradesh. Table A1 provides the
descriptive statistics of variables used in the estimation of the distance function. We report the
estimates of parameters of distance function in Table A2. Using the estimated distance function,
we estimate the shadow price of a pollutant in terms of the units of the good output foregone for
one unit reduction in pollution. The computed shadow prices for a representative plant of
APGENCO are Rs. 1043.688, 11539.15, and 5866.812 respectively, per ton reduction in
SPM, NOx, and SO2. The current electricity tariff for industries in AP is on average Rs. 3.60 per
unit which is used to compute the shadow prices.
Table A2: Estimates of Parameters of Output Distance Function
Coefficients of the Output Distance Function Model
20 SANDEE Working Paper No. 48-10
Table A3: Description of Variables in the Estimated Distance Function
Names of Variables and their Identification
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Appendix B: Coase-Becker Model of Collective Action
We use the following notation to develop a model of collective action in industrial pollution
abatement.
E : Environmental quality corresponding to statutory level of pollution;19
∧
E : Actual environmental quality attained by industry;
E: Environmental quality reported by bureaucracy;
D( )E  : Actual damage received by affected people, ( ) ( ) 0,0 /// >< EDED
( )EA  :  Cost of treatment of effluent to the industry, ( ) ( ) 0,0 /// ≥≥ EAEA
W: Time devoted by affected people for political organization
V ( )W  : Cost of political organization
( )Wλ : Probability with which affected people (or a fraction thereof) perceive damages from the
degraded environment;
t: Pollution tax per unit of effluent
b: Bribe received by bureaucracy from industry per unit of over-reporting of environmental
quality
p: Penalty on bureaucracy per unit of under-reporting of environmental quality
s: Penalty on industry per unit of non-disclosure of effluent quality
Now, we can identify the cost and benefits to various agents involved in the industrial water
pollution abatement as follows:
(a) Perceived damages of affected people
(b) Income to municipal committee
(c) Income to bureaucracy
19 In the case of an optimal pollution tax or the Pigouvian tax, the liability of a firm is computed as tax rate
multiplied by the difference between the actual pollution level and the pollution level with respect to
which the marginal damage is zero.  However, in the case of the taxes-and-standards method (Baumo and
Oates, 1988), we compute the tax liability of a firm as the tax rate multiplied by the difference between the
actual and statutory level (level corresponding to pollution standards) of pollution.
<_ <_
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(d) Cost to factory
Net perceived cost to society can be defined as
Net actual cost to society can be defined as
Group I: Affected people and municipal committee with a strategy W and cost function
Group II: Industry and bureaucracy with a strategy E and cost function
Given penalties and bribe (p, s, b), Group I minimizes G1 with respect to W given E while
Group II minimizes G2 with respect to E given W.  We have:
Equations (B9) and (B10) yield the reaction functions of Groups I and II which are respectively
given by (B11) and (B12)
We define the equilibrium strategies of the two-persons Nash non-cooperative game as
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which are given by the intersection of curves depicting the reaction functions of Group I and II in
Fig. 4.
Proposition 1: Increasing penalties s and p on industry and bureaucracy have the effects of
increasing environmental quality E, given W, and decreasing the time devoted to political activity
W, given the environmental quality E.  The equilibrium environmental quality of a two-person
Nash non-cooperative game increases as either s or p or s and p increase20.
20 See Murty (1995) for proof.
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TABLES
Table 1: Shadow Prices of Pollutants
(Rs. per tonne)
Table 2: Physical and Monetary Accounts of Air Pollution for an Average Thermal Power
Generating Firm in AP
Note: Row 2 of Table shows the data of observed emissions of SPM, NOX, and SO2
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FIGURES
Figure 1: Pigouvain Tax
Figure 2: Pollution Tax and Standards
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Figure 3: Cosean Bargaining
Figure 4: Abatement Function for SPM concentration
Figure 5:  Abatement Function for SO2 Concentration
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 Figure 6: Abatement Function for NOx Concentration
 Figure 7: Strategic Behavior of Active Groups in Water Pollution Abatement
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